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Abstract
We present cross-country empirical evidence on the role of natural resources in 
explaining long-run differences in private investment as a share of GDP in a sample 
of 72 developing countries. Our empirical results suggest important differences 
between oil and non-oil resources. While revenue from oil exports tends to increase 
private (and public) investment, there is also a robust negative effect from a measure 
of export concentration. After controlling for these two aspects of export structure, 
there is little additional information in other measures of resource abundance, or in 
other suggested investment determinants, such as measures of the quality of 
institutions, political instability or macroeconomic volatility. 
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I. Introduction
Starting with the important contribution by Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001), a large 
body of empirical research has documented a negative association between natural 
resource abundance and economic growth. This paradox that countries rich in natural 
resources tend to have poor growth and development outcomes is commonly referred 
to as the “resource curse”. 
There is no single explanation for the tendency of resource-rich countries to have 
poorer economic performance. These countries tend to suffer from the adverse effects 
of Dutch disease, revenue volatility and primary commodity dependence. More 
importantly, resource abundance has also been associated with lower human capital 
(Gylfason 2001), higher risk of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2003), more unequal 
societies (Gylfason and Zoega 2003), and weaker institutions (Ross 1999).
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An important insight of this literature is that the origin of weak institutions is often 
located in natural resource export structures. Resource rich economies offer distinct 
opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption (Ross 1999), tend to have weaker checks 
and balances in their political systems (Collier and Hoeffler 2005) and a limited 
institutional capacity to manage shocks (Johnson et al. 2005). In particular, point-
source resources—oil, gas and minerals—are typically associated with concentrated 
ownership, a rentier class and weak institutions. It has been suggested that the quality 
of institutions plays a decisive role in determining whether natural resources are a 
curse or a blessing (Mehlum et al. 2006).
This paper studies a relatively neglected aspect of this literature: the relationship 
between natural resources and aggregate investment. While much of the resource 
curse literature has focused on growth, there are relatively few studies analyzing the 
effects of natural resources on investment levels. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004, 2007) 
suggest that the adverse effects of resource abundance on growth are partly 
transmitted through lower investment. Gylfason and Zoega (2006) present some 
preliminary evidence that countries richly endowed with natural resources tend to 
have lower investment shares in GDP – although, as subsequent discussion in this 
paper will show, these statistical findings are based on a possibly questionable 
specification.
Existing empirical research on the relationship between natural resources and 
investment is unsatisfactory in at least two respects. First, there are concerns 
surrounding the use of suitable indicators for capturing natural resource abundance. 
Much like the broader literature on the resource curse, the investment results may be 
sensitive to the choice of resource measures. Second, existing work is purely 
exploratory in nature and has made little attempt to control for confounding factors 
that have traditionally been considered to be important in the empirical literature on 
investment. This provides one motivation for the more systematic empirical 
evaluation of the link between resource abundance and investment that we provide in 
this paper. Another motivation is that the empirical association between resource 
endowments and investment is not yet settled. In fact, one of the earliest proponents 
1 Interested readers are referred to a more detailed review of this literature in van der Ploeg (2006). 2
of the resource curse hypothesis, Sachs and Warner (1999), argued that natural 
resource intensity is unrelated to investment.
Taken together, the limited work that exists on this issue indicates that natural 
resources can affect growth indirectly via saving and investment. There are many 
plausible reasons why natural resources might crowd out investment. Many of the 
mechanisms behind the resource curse that were described above—Dutch disease, 
rent-seeking, civil war, inequality and weak institutions—are likely to harm the 
investment climate.  Natural resource wealth may also be associated with lower 
savings and investment, since as Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) note, “natural 
resources provide a continuous stream of future wealth that makes future welfare less 
dependent on the transfer of man-made capital to future periods (Corden 1984; 
Gylfason and Zoega 2001).” 
Dependence on natural resources can invite greater exposure to commodity price 
volatility, which can in turn result in higher investor uncertainty and lower levels of 
private investment.
2 Natural resource abundance can also reduce the competitiveness 
of other export sectors, preventing these countries from enjoying the benefits of 
(manufacturing) export-led growth (Sachs and Warner 2001). 
This paper is one of the first systematic attempts at studying the relationship between 
natural resources and aggregate investment. Given the importance of using an 
appropriate measure of resource abundance, we experiment with a range of alternative 
measures. In particular, our empirical work will emphasize the considerable 
explanatory power of two measures, the share of net oil exports in GDP and the 
export concentration index, in regression models of private investment as a share of 
GDP. We will pay particular attention to the effects of other potentially important 
determinants of investment, such as the quality of political institutions, ethnic 
diversity and openness to trade, while taking care to control for a host of other 
influences suggested by the earlier literature. These include, among others, political 
instability, financial development and macroeconomic volatility. The empirical 
analysis is based on a cross-section of 72 developing countries for the period 1970-
1998, for which data on private investment is available. Since our primary interest lies 
in explaining long-run differences in investment rates across countries, we restrict the 
empirical focus of this paper to cross-sectional regressions.
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The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests a more subtle relationship 
between natural resources and investment levels. In analyzing the effects of natural 
resources, we identify different effects of oil and non-oil resources on private 
investment. More specifically, a higher share of net oil exports in GDP is associated 
with higher investment levels. Controlling for this oil effect, we also find a robust 
negative association between export concentration and investment shares. After 
controlling for these two factors, none of the conventional resource measures have 
any additional explanatory power. We take this evidence to suggest that it is the 
2 The empirical link between volatility and private investment is well documented in Aizenman and 
Marion (1999).
3 An additional reason is that repeated observations on key variables of interest, capturing such diverse 
dimensions as endowments, geography and institutions, are either not available or show limited 
variation over time. Both of these aspects limit the usefulness of panel data methods in this context.3
structure of exports, rather than natural resources per se, that is relevant for explaining 
investment.
These effects survive after including a range of other controls. Consistent with the 
previous literature on investment, we find that the relative price of capital and ethnic 
diversity are negatively associated with private investment, whereas more open 
economies tend to have higher investment shares. Strikingly, after controlling for 
these dimensions, the direct effects of political institutions, political instability and 
macroeconomic volatility appear to be limited. Our results are also found to be robust 
to treating export concentration and openness to trade as endogenous variables in our 
investment models.
Our paper is related to an emerging strand of empirical literature which challenges the 
resource curse thesis. It complements the findings in Lederman and Maloney (2007), 
who find that the negative effect of trade structure on growth dominates that of natural 
resources. Subsequent work has further questioned the existence of a resource curse.  
Manzano and Rigobon (2007) attribute the resource curse effect to debt overhang, 
demonstrating that the weak economic performance of resource rich countries is a 
result of accumulation of foreign debt during periods of high commodity prices. 
Another empirical challenge to the resource curse thesis comes from Brunnschweiler 
(2008), who finds that natural resources have a positive effect on economic growth. 
Importantly, recent statistical findings have also disputed the harmful effects of 
natural resources, especially oil, on democracy (Herb 2005; Haber and Menaldo 2007; 
Brunnschweiler 2008). Our paper extends this recent empirical literature on the 
resource curse by presenting related evidence on aggregate investment levels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data on natural 
resources and other key control variables. Section III reports the main empirical 
results and associated robustness tests. Finally, section IV offers concluding remarks. 
II. Data, sample and variables
In this section, we discuss issues concerning the measurement of natural resource 
abundance and other variables used in our analysis. The core set of regressions 
reported in this paper is based on a sample of 72 developing countries. We exclude 
former socialist economies from our sample. Aside from this, the choice of our 
sample is largely dictated by issues of data availability. The variables we use and their 
exact sources are documented in Appendix 2. A complete list of the sample countries 
is provided in Appendix 3. 
(a) Measuring natural resource abundance
A central issue in the resource curse literature relates to the measurement of natural 
resources. In fact, much of the debate on the existence of the resource curse revolves 
around this measurement issue. This growing body of literature has shown that
empirical findings on the resource curse are extremely sensitive to the choice of 
resource measures. Given this significance, we will discuss in relatively more detail 
the various natural resource indicators we consider. 4
It is common in the literature to rely on relative measures of resource abundance. In 
earlier work, the share of primary commodity exports in GDP (or in total exports), 
sxp, was one of the most widely used proxies for natural resource abundance. The 
commodity exports measure is a crude proxy and does not directly measure resource 
wealth. For instance, not all resource rich societies have a high proportion of primary 
commodity exports. Besides, it may represent other influences: the share of primary 
commodities in GDP can be driven by policy rather than resource dependence per se.
More direct and conceptually appealing indicators of resource abundance have been
recently compiled and published by the World Bank (1997, 2005). These are based on 
the net present value of the stream of rents. Total national wealth is divided into three 
main components: produced assets, human resources and natural capital. The measure 
of natural capital is based on agricultural land, pasture lands, forests, protected areas, 
metals and minerals, and coal, oil and natural gas. Estimates for the value of subsoil 
assets (metals, minerals, coal, oil and natural gas) are derived by taking present values 
of the total rents over the projected life of the resource deposit.
4 Two variations of the 
natural wealth data have been fruitfully employed in the recent literature: the share of 
natural capital in total wealth (lncs) and the value of natural capital per capita (lncap),
both expressed in natural logs. We have constructed these ratios using the updated 
wealth data available for 2000. 
The wealth data, although more closely tied with the notion of resource abundance, 
does raise some identification problems in empirical work. For instance, when natural 
capital as a share of total wealth is used as a measure of resource abundance, a 
negative correlation might result if the denominator—total wealth—is positively 
correlated with the dependent variable, growth of real GDP per capita or the 
investment rate.
5 Using suitable instruments for the natural capital share may be a 
solution, but good instruments are hard to find. The use of natural wealth per capita
may therefore be more appropriate in this context. Studies using this indicator tend to 
find a positive effect of natural resources on economic growth—see, for example, 
Brunnschweiler (2008). It is useful to note that natural wealth per capita correlates 
quite highly with per capita income.
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Since specialization in minerals and fuels is often associated with greater economic 
distortions (Auty, 2000, 2001), it is sensible to focus more directly on measures of 
these resources. Two measures based on production data for minerals have received 
particular attention in the literature: the share of mineral production in GNP in 1971 
(snr) and the share of mining in GDP. As Brunnschweiler (2008) notes, mineral 
indicators are marred by lack of consistent quality of the data on mineral production, 
absence of weights to value different minerals and possible endogeneity concerns
(raised by the influence of technology and economic development on mineral 
production).
4 Yearly production (extraction) of these subsoil assets is valued using estimates of resource rents (net 
operating surplus less a normal return on produced assets). The return is smoothed over the period 
1998-2000 and then capitalized at a 4 percent discount rate over the remaining time to exhaustion. 
Present value is calculated by assuming an optimal path for unit scarcity rents and a constant revenue 
stream.
5 Note that total wealth includes produced capital, and is measured at the end of the period over which 
investment rates are averaged.
6 The simple correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.63.5
Amongst the different types of natural resources, oil stands out for its distinct effects 
on political economy. Relative measures of oil resources have received considerable 
attention in the economics and political science literatures, partly due to the 
significantly higher rents that they have generated since the early 1970s. Economies 
dependent on oil exports seem to have poor institutional outcomes. A popular thesis, 
proposed by Ross (2001), is that oil fuels authoritarianism. In theory, this may be 
possible because revenues from oil tend to reduce reliance on taxation, create 
incentives for rent-seeking and make state repression more likely. 
However, existing indicators may not satisfactorily capture this “fiscal impact of oil”
(Haber and Menaldo 2007). For example, the ratio of fuel exports to GDP, which is 
one of the more commonly used measures in the literature, does not properly 
encapsulate the effect of oil on government revenues. Ross (2006) proposes another 
related indicator: the ratio of windfall profits from oil to GNP. But, this assumes that 
all countries tax oil profits identically.
7 Herb (2005) proposes a more theoretically 
appealing measure that captures the impact of oil on government revenues: the ratio 
of revenues from petroleum and minerals to total government revenues (rent). A 
related measure constructed by Herb (2005) is the ratio of net oil exports to GDP, 
where net oil exports are defined as follows:
[(fuel exports/merchandise exports) – (fuel imports/merchandise imports)]
The net oil exports to GDP ratio is denoted as netoil. For both of these measures, we 
use period averages for 1972-98. Herb’s measures have recently gained attention in 
the political science literature, but have not yet made their way into the mainstream 
economics literature on the resource curse. Our empirical analysis will pay particular 
attention to these oil-based measures of natural resources.
A different way of characterizing resource-dependent countries is to consider dummy 
variables based on different resource specializations. Isham et al. (2005) propose 
several export classifications based on a country’s natural resource base. The 
following are especially relevant for our empirical analysis: dummy variable for 
point-source resources (fuels, minerals and plantation crops, respoint), and dummy 
variable for coffee and cocoa (rescoff).
8 Isham et al. (2005) have convincingly shown 
that a country’s export structure is linked to its institutional quality and economic 
growth. In particular, point-source resources that have more intensive and localized 
production patterns are associated with greater opportunities for rent-seeking. 
A related export-based measure that will be central to our empirical analysis is 
UNCTAD’s export concentration index, which is denoted as excon in our regressions. 
This is a modified version of a Herfindahl-Hirschmann index, and is defined as:
7 Windfall profits are calculated as the price received per barrel minus the cost of production per barrel, 
multiplied by the number of barrels produced.
8 The classification of export structures is based on UNCTAD’s Handbook of International Trade and 
Development Statistics, 1988.6
where exports are disaggregated into N products (239 three-digit SITC product 
categories in the UNCTAD measure) indexed by j, E is the total value of exports, and 
Ej is the value of exports of product j. excon has been normalized to lie in the range 
between 0 to 1, where larger values of the index reflect higher concentration of 
exports in a narrow range of products. We use the average of this measure for the 
period, 1980-1998 and express it in natural logs.
Table 1 summarizes the basic correlations between the various indicators of natural 
resource abundance described above.  The numbers in Table 1 suggest a positive 
correlation between primary exports share (sxp) and other resource measures, 
especially share of natural resources (snr), net oil exports (netoil) and export 
concentration index (lexcon). Amongst the included variables, lexcon is more 
positively correlated with the natural capital share (lncs). As expected, variables 
measuring oil wealth and its effects, netoil and rent, have a strong positive correlation 
with the World Bank measure of natural wealth per capita (lncap).
(b) Other variables
The main aim of our paper is to investigate the effect of natural resource abundance 
on levels of investment. Our principal focus will be on investigating the link between 
natural resources and the share of private investment in GDP. This ties in well with 
the empirical literature on investment determinants that has mainly focused on private 
investment. In this regard, we use the disaggregated investment series compiled for 
the World Bank by Glen and Sumlinksi (1998). We restrict our sample period to 
1970-98, the period for which this data is readily available. For the sake of 
completeness, we consider two other measures of investment as well: the share of 
public investment in GDP, also from Glen and Sumlinksi (1998), and the broader 
measure of total gross domestic investment as a share of GDP, obtained from the 
World Development Indicators. We will use the natural logarithms of these 
investment shares as dependent variables.
Our empirical investigation considers a wide range of candidate predictors of 
investment. In choosing these indicators, we were principally guided by the existing
literature on investment and, more generally, by the cross-sectional studies of long-
run development outcomes. Institutional quality has been stressed as an important 
investment correlate (Stasavage 2002). The resource curse literature also suggests the 
quality of political institutions as a channel through which natural resources may have 
adverse effects on economic performance (e.g. Ross (1999), Collier and Hoeffler 
(2005), Johnson et al. (2005)), or as a key determinant of whether resource abundance 
is a curse or a blessing (Mehlum et al. 2006). 
The core empirical specification in this paper will thus always include some measure 
of the quality of institutions. Our preferred indicator is the measure of checks and 
balances (checks) developed by the World Bank’s Database on Political Institutions 
(DPI)—see Beck et al. (2001). The key advantage of this measure is that, unlike many 
perception-based indicators, checks measures a deeper and more permanent feature of 
political institutions: the extent of political constraints and checks and balances faced 
by decision makers. The checks indicator “counts the number of veto players in a 
political system, adjusting for whether these veto players are independent of each 7
other, as determined by the level of electoral competitiveness in a system, their 
respective party affiliations, and the electoral rules” (Beck et al. 2001). It ranges 
between 1 and 15, with 15 indicating the highest level of checks and balances. We 
will use the period average of checks for 1975-98.
9
There are two other basic sources for the data on political institutions. In the course of 
our empirical work, we will also experiment with a measure of constraints on the 
executive (xconst) constructed by the Polity IV database. We use an average for the 
1970-98 period. In some preliminary empirical work, we have also considered
Kaufmann et al. (1999)’s “aggregate governance index” (kkz), which is a simple 
average of six separate indicators on voice and accountability, political instability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and graft.
10
As well as the quality of political institutions, we also consider a range of possible 
macroeconomic determinants of investment shares suggested by the earlier literature. 
These include the relative price of capital goods (pi_p), and measures of volatility in 
several macroeconomic variables, constructed either as standard deviations or as 
coefficients of variation for the annual series over our sample period. Other variables 
that we will emphasize in our analysis include the index of ethnic fractionalization
(ethnic) due to Alesina et al. (1999) and the average trade to GDP ratio, obtained from 
World Development Indicators. 
Our key source for data on financial development is the well-known Financial 
Structure Database compiled by World Bank researchers (see Beck et al. 1999). This 
dataset provides around 37 indicators capturing various facets of financial systems. 
The main indicator that we use in this paper is the ratio of private sector credit to 
GDP, averaged over the estimation period.
11 Our regression analysis will also include 
indicators of socio-political instability and geographical characteristics.
III. Empirical results
We present cross-country regression results where the dependent variables are 
averaged over the period 1970-98. In selecting possible explanatory variables, we 
have been guided by the previous literature that has considered models of investment 
in a cross-country regression framework. We emphasize models based on robust 
predictors, identified through several rounds of model selection procedures. We use 
both the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) and PcGets approaches to model 
selection.
12 Variables flagged as being important by these procedures are then used in 
formulating our preferred models. However, these model selection procedures were 
used mainly as a first step to guide our choice of included variables. This paper will 
stress additional variable tests to ascertain the robustness of our empirical results to 
other explanations. The background model selection tests are separately discussed in a 
companion paper (Bond and Malik 2008).
9 Data on the checks variable is available from 1975.
10 These indicators are themselves based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions 
of governance from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different organizations.
11 In earlier investigations we also considered other financial indicators, such as the ratio of liquid 
liabilities to GDP.
12 An introductory treatment of BMA can be found in Raftery (1995) and Raftery et al. (2007). For a 
general description of PcGets, see Campos et al. (2003) and Hendry and Krolzig (2004).8
The partial scatter plots reveal strong correlations between export concentration, net 
oil exports and private investment share. Figure 1 suggests a strong negative 
correlation between the log of private investment share and the export concentration 
index. Figures 2 and 3 suggest a strong positive correlation of the net oil exports 
variable (netoil) with both private investment share and export concentration.
III-A. Main findings
We now present the main results of this study. We begin with the results from
relatively parsimonious regression specifications that contain our key variables of 
interest. Columns (1)-(3) of Table 2 present these results for models where the 
dependent variable is the log of the share of private investment in GDP (Lprinv). Our 
initial specification in column (1) includes five explanatory variables: the relative 
price of capital goods (pi_p), the indicator of political institutions (checks), the log of 
the average trade to GDP ratio (Lopenwb), the index of ethnic fractionalization 
(ethnic), and a dummy variable for the East Asia and Pacific region (reg_eap).
As expected, the relative price of investment goods, sometimes regarded as a proxy 
for cross-country variation in the user cost of capital, helps to explain variation in 
these investment shares. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that countries with a higher relative price of capital goods tend to invest 
less, on average.
Another key variable included throughout our regression models is the quality of 
political institutions. The potential importance of political institutions and governance 
structures in explaining investment rates is suggested by earlier studies, for example 
Stasavage (2002). Importantly, it has been suggested that the negative impact of 
natural resources on economic performance may be mediated through their effect on 
the strength and quality of institutions (Ross 2001; Isham et al. 2005; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2005). In our exploratory work, we found some weak evidence for various 
measures of executive constraints. We found the measure of checks and balances 
(checks), developed by Beck et al. (2001), to be particularly informative in the context 
of explaining these investment shares. 
We include this measure of institutional quality in our basic specification in column 
(1) and find a positive and weakly significant coefficient on checks, suggesting that 
countries with greater checks and balances on the use of power tend to have higher 
shares of private investment in GDP. One interpretation is that countries with 
“multiple decision makers” can be expected to offer greater protection of investors 
from arbitrary actions and opportunistic expropriation on the part of government. We 
found a similarly positive effect of the quality of political institutions if we replaced
the checks measure with POLITY IV indicator on constraints on the executive 
(xconst) or Kaufmann et al.’s aggregate governance index (kkz).
We also obtain an expected positive coefficient on trade openness, measured by the 
log of the World Bank measure of trade shares in GDP (Lopenwb). Countries that are
more open to trade also tend to have high private investment. Another interesting 
result relates to the effect of ethnic fractionalization. Our results find a strong negative 9
association between the index of ethnic fractionalization and private investment 
rates.
13
This is consistent with the findings of a broader research agenda on the link between 
ethnic diversity and economic development—see, for example, Easterly and Levine 
(1997) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). In particular, Mauro (1995) suggests 
potential links between ethnic diversity and investment: ethnic fractionalization can 
affect investment indirectly by increasing corruption, risk of civil war and political 
instability. It can also exert a more direct effect on investment by slowing down the 
diffusion of ideas and technology. Finally, the coefficient on a regional dummy 
variable for East Asia and Pacific countries is positive and significant, indicating that 
the included variables do not fully account for the relatively high investment shares in 
East Asia. 
Column (2) turns to the principal objective of this paper: to explore the role of natural 
resources in explaining cross-country variation in these private investment shares. For 
this, we include two of our preferred indicators: the log of the export concentration 
index (Lexcon) and the ratio of net oil exports to GDP (netoil). We find considerable 
empirical support for both of these indicators. Countries that derive a greater 
proportion of their GDP from net oil exports appear to have higher investment levels, 
as suggested by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on netoil. Such a 
favourable effect of oil revenues on investment is plausible given that countries which 
experienced oil booms often experienced consequent investment booms. The 
distinctly positive effect of oil may also be attributed to the capital-intensive nature of 
oil production. 
However, after controlling for this effect of oil, we find that higher export 
concentration is associated with lower investment shares. This is implied by the 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on lexcon. The effect of export 
concentration on investment needs to be interpreted carefully, as it could be consistent 
with several possible explanations. Specialization or dependence on a narrow range of 
exports may be efficient in the sense that it may be associated with scale economies, 
high levels of productivity and a higher per capita income. On the other hand, export 
concentration may negatively affect investment and growth via greater exposure to 
terms of trade shocks and adverse political economy effects. 
The results in Table 2 suggest that these negative effects of export concentration 
dominate. This negative effect may be a broader manifestation of the harmful effects 
of resource abundance. For example, Lexcon may be acting as a proxy for other 
resource indicators, with which it is highly correlated.
14 This would also accord well 
with the contention that natural resource specialization crowds out manufacturing 
activity, described as a key explanation for the resource curse (Sachs and Warner 
2001). Resource abundant countries have not tended to avail opportunities for 
(manufacturing) export-led growth. 
13 However, contrary to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), we did not find a similar relationship 
between their index of ethnic polarization and investment.
14 Table 1 indicates a high correlation of Lexcon with primary exports share, sxp, (0.45) and natural 
capital share, Lncs, (0.49). We consider this possibility further in section III-B below.10
However, the negative effect of export concentration on the share of private 
investment in GDP may reflect a wider array of forces than simply natural resource 
dependence. It is commonly recognized that trade structures narrowly concentrated in 
a few products, mainly primary commodities, are associated with other development 
disadvantages, such as vulnerability to external shocks and capture of political 
institutions. Viewed from this perspective, the negative effect of lexcon may be 
viewed as summarizing the broader impact of trade structure on investment.
The inclusion of lexcon and netoil in column (2) does not change the sign or statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficients on the other variables in the conditioning 
set. The only exception is the coefficient on checks, which was marginally significant 
in column (1) but becomes less informative when these natural resource/export 
structure variables are added in column (2). Our preferred specification in column (2) 
has good explanatory power: it explains 68 percent of the total variation in private 
investment shares.
Column (3) introduces a full set of dummy variables to capture regional effects for 
South Asia (reg_sa), Sub-Saharan Africa (reg_ssa), Latin America and Caribbean 
(reg_lac) and Middle East and North Africa (reg_mena). These dummy variables are 
based on the World Bank regional classifications. There does not seem to be any 
significant additional information in these regional dummy variables. We continue to 
find a significant negative coefficient on export concentration and a significant 
positive coefficient on net oil exports. Together with ethnic fractionalization, trade 
openness and the relative price of capital, these variables account for the relatively 
low private investment shares observed in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. 
For comparison, columns (4) and (5) present the results for models where the 
dependent variable is replaced with the log of public and total investment shares, 
respectively. In column (4) we start with the same specification considered in column 
(2), with the only change that the dependent variable is now the log of the average 
public investment share in GDP (lpbinv). The relative price of capital (pi_p), ethnic 
fractionalization (ethnic) and export concentration (lexcon) are relatively 
uninformative in explaining variation in public investment shares. We find a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient on checks, which suggests that the main effect 
of checks and balances is on constraining public sector capital spending. 
There is also a strong positive correlation between trade openness and public 
investment, consistent with the long-standing claim that more open economies tend to
have larger governments (Rodrik 1998). Similarly, the coefficient on netoil is positive
and significant, suggesting that oil revenues are used to finance public investment. 
This is also corroborated by case study evidence which shows how oil rents are often 
channelled through higher levels of public investment and how oil booms are 
routinely followed by public investment booms (Collier and Gunning 1999). 
However, it is noticeable that these variables together explain only 21 percent of the 
total variation across countries in public investment shares in GDP.
Column (5) repeats the same specification for the total investment share, defined here 
as the log of average gross domestic investment as a share of GDP (lgdi). These 
results are broadly consistent with the findings from our models of private investment 
shares. Most of our results related to oil abundance, ethnicity, openness and the 11
relative price of capital continue to hold. Though negatively signed, the coefficient on 
export concentration loses statistical significance. 
Taken together, these results suggest that having exports concentrated in oil is likely 
to be associated with higher levels of private investment. However, after controlling 
for this distinct effect of oil, there is a more menacing influence of export 
concentration on private investment. This can partly be a manifestation of an 
underlying dependence on natural resources. But it can also arguably indicate the 
deeper disadvantages of a trade structure unduly dependent on non-oil primary 
commodities. In subsequent sections, we will check the robustness of these findings to 
other commonly used measures of natural resources, and additional explanatory 
variables.
III-B. Robustness to other explanations
This section will explore the robustness of our main results. We will show that our 
key findings are robust to the inclusion of further natural resource measures, and other 
possible determinants of private investment shares suggested by the previous 
literature. In doing so, we consider in particular the role of political instability,
macroeconomic volatility, financial development, macroeconomic distortions and 
geographic characteristics. We also allow for the possible endogeneity of our trade 
openness and export concentration variables. The analysis in this section focuses on 
models for the log of private sector investment as a share of GDP.
(a) Other indicators of natural resources
A first and perhaps the most important aspect of robustness relates to the choice of 
resource measure employed. This becomes all the more important given that the 
nature of disagreements in this literature largely revolves around the question of 
measurement. So far, our estimations have relied on the export concentration index 
and the share of net fuel exports in GDP as the two preferred measures. Here, we 
compare these results to other alternative measures of resource abundance, especially 
close proxies for netoil.
The choice of resource measures considered in this robustness exercise is partly 
dictated by the need to keep the sample size as large as possible. Keeping the sample 
size fixed at 62 countries, we successively include eight additional natural resource 
indicators. Results from these specifications are presented in Table 3. We begin in 
column (1) by re-estimating our preferred specification for this reduced sample of 62 
countries. The results are broadly similar to those presented in Table 2. As before, 
coefficients on the relative price of capital, ethnic fractionalization and export 
concentration are negative and significant. On the other hand, trade openness and net 
oil exports exert a significant positive effect on private investment shares. Re-
estimating the specification in Table 2 on the 62 country sample has the virtue of 
demonstrating that the results are robust to reducing the sample size.
Recently, some studies have employed natural wealth data from the World Bank to 
demonstrate a positive effect of natural resources on economic growth 
(Brunnschweiler 2008). We first consider the possibility that the positive effect of oil 
is simply a proxy for natural wealth per capita. Adding the log of natural wealth per 12
capita (lncap) in column (2) yields a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient. 
The negative effect of export concentration and the positive effect of net oil exports 
remain intact, although the coefficient on export concentration is significant only at 
the 10% level in this specification.
Column (3) adds a related, though arguably a less appropriate measure of resource 
abundance, the log of the share of natural capital in total wealth (lncs).
15 The inclusion 
of lncs in previous studies has often resulted in a negative correlation with investment 
and growth (Gylfason and Zoega 2006). We obtain a negative coefficient on lncs, but 
it is insignificantly different from zero, while the coefficients on netoil and lexcon
remain significant at the 1% and 10% levels respectively.
16 The specification used in 
Gylfason and Zoega (2006) simultaneously includes both lncap and lncs, obtaining a 
positive coefficient on the former and a negative coefficient on the latter variable. As 
the absolute value of these two coefficients is similar, their model in fact suggests a 
positive effect from the log of total wealth per capita, with the natural capital terms in 
the numerator of the two ratios cancelling out. Appendix 1 presents results for 
specifications which include both these natural capital terms, and provides further 
discussion. The bottom line is that we find these two variables to be both individually 
and jointly insignificant when added to our main specification.
Column (4) adds the dummy variable for fuel exporting nations (fuel_exp) constructed 
by the World Bank.
17 Again, it does not have any additional explanatory power. 
Clearly, the continuous measure of oil exports (netoil) is more informative than the 
binary dummy for oil-exporting nations. Next, we include the ratio of petroleum and 
mineral revenues to total government revenues (rent) in column (5). Coming from the 
same source, Herb (2005), rent is a close proxy for the netoil variable. The simple 
correlation between the two variables is 0.87. However, when included together the 
effect of netoil clearly dominates.
18
Column (6) checks the robustness of our results to another resource measure, the 
share of mineral production in GNP in 1971 (snr). Again, there is no additional 
information in snr: the coefficient on snr is negative but statistically insignificant. 
netoil continues to have a strong positive effect and the coefficient on lexcon is 
negative and statistically significant. Column (7) considers another popular measure 
of natural resources, the share of primary commodity exports in GDP (sxp). The 
coefficient on this variable is insignificant, and its inclusion again has little impact on 
the two resource effects emphasized in our paper.
Finally, column (8) considers two separate dummy variables for countries whose 
export structure predominantly relies on point-source resources (respoint) and coffee 
and cocoa (rescoff). This is inspired by the suggestion in Isham et al. (2005) that 
15 As discussed in the data section, the presence in the denominator of total wealth, which is the sum of 
natural, produced and intangible capital, may cause a spurious correlation with the dependent variable, 
the log of the private investment share. 
16 However, dropping Lexcon from this specification does yield a statistically significant negative 
coefficient on Lncs.
17 The dummy variable equals one if more than 50% of a country’s exports consist of oil.
18 We do find that both fuel_exp and rent are good proxies for netoil, in the sense that the coefficients 
on these variables become positive and statistically significant if we exclude netoil from the 
specification.13
different types of resource endowments can influence economic growth by shaping 
socio-economic and political institutions. In particular, countries with a point-source 
or coffee/cocoa type of natural resource base tend to have weaker institutions and
poorer economic performance. The results from including respoint and rescoff in
column (8) are reassuring. Neither of thee two variables has any additional 
explanatory power.
Collectively, the results presented in this section provide solid empirical support for
the choice of our main resource variables. The inclusion of a variety of additional 
natural resource measures suggested in the literature shows that the relevant 
information for explaining differences in private investment shares is contained 
mainly in export concentration (lexcon) and net oil exports (netoil).
(b) Macroeconomic volatility
We now control for possible investment determinants suggested by the literature. 
Indicators of macroeconomic volatility or uncertainty have been suggested as
potentially important determinants of cross-country differences in average investment 
shares in earlier studies (e.g. Aizenman and Marion (1999), Serven (2003)). 
Additionally, volatility has also been identified as one of the consequences of 
specialization in natural resources. Evidence suggests that volatility in resource-rich 
countries is several orders of magnitude higher than in countries where natural 
resource exports account for a smaller share in GDP (Ploeg and Poelhekke 2007). It is 
thus possible that the effect of trade structure highlighted in this paper is merely a 
reflection of the effect of volatility on investment. 
In this sub-section, we consider a wide range of possible volatility measures as 
additional explanatory variables to test the robustness of our results. Results are 
presented in Table 4. The revised sample for this empirical exercise, dictated by the 
availability of data on the volatility measures, is 65 countries. Column (1) again
replicates our preferred specification on this reduced sample. Our model explains 68 
percent of the total variation in private investment shares. Except for the checks
variable, coefficients on all other included variables are statistically significant at 1 
percent level. In particular, there is a strong negative effect of lexcon and a strong 
positive effect of netoil on private investment shares.
We first add a commonly used measure of growth volatility (grvol) in column (2). It is 
defined as the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita
during the estimation period.
19 The inclusion of grvol does not alter any of our results 
and its coefficient is individually insignificant.
Next, we control for volatility of the terms of trade (vtot) in column (3). This is 
measured as the standard deviation of the first log-differences of the annual terms of 
trade series during the estimation period. The coefficient on vtot is negatively signed
but insignificant. However, with the inclusion of terms of trade volatility, the 
19 We use the first log-differences to define growth rates. 14
coefficient on lexcon is significant only at the 5% level, as opposed to the 1% level in 
columns (1) and (2).
20
Results in columns (4) and (5) indicate that there is also no statistically significant 
additional explanatory power in two further measures of macroeconomic volatility. 
These are the standard deviations of the share of government consumption in GDP 
(vgcons) and the ratio of M1 to GDP (monvol).
21 In both cases, the significance of the 
coefficients on our measures of export concentration, net oil exports, and other control 
variables is found to be robust to the inclusion of these additional volatility 
measures.
22
In sum, having controlled for resource abundance, trade, ethnic fractionalization, the 
relative price of capital and institutional quality, we do not find additional explanatory 
power in these measures of macroeconomic volatility. One possible interpretation is 
that volatile outcomes are a symptom of certain deeper characteristics, which may 
predispose some economies to be more unstable than others. In this context it is 
interesting to note that resource abundance tends to increase a country’s exposure to 
some economic shocks, and this has been suggested to be an important channel 
explaining the relationship between resource abundance and poor economic 
performance (Collier 2006; Ploeg and Poelhekke 2007).
(c) Political instability
A third robustness issue relates to the role of political instability in hampering private 
investment. Previous empirical research has flagged political instability as a 
potentially important determinant of private investment shares (e.g. Svensson (1999), 
Alesina and Perotti (1998), Campos and Nugent (2002)). It has been argued that 
political instability can delay investment, destroy existing capital stock and result in 
harmful political uncertainty (Campos and Nugent, 2002). At the same time, civil and 
political strife has also been regarded as an important consequence of natural resource 
intensity (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Thus, political instability may be an omitted 
dimension in our empirical analysis. 
In order to assess the possibility that our resource indicators are acting as empirical 
proxies for political instability, Table 4 considers two common measures of political 
instability as additional explanatory variables in columns (6) and (7). We add the 
measure of socio-political instability (SPI) proposed by Campos and Nugent (2002) in 
column (6). The SPI measure is constructed as a principal component of three 
underlying counts of the number of political assassinations, revolutions and successful 
coups in the estimation period. As is standard in the literature, we obtained the 
comparative data on these individual dimensions of political instability from Arthur S. 
Banks’ Cross National Time Series database.
23 In column (7) we include the log of 
20 When entered on its own in the absence of other variables (not reported in the table), vtot has a 
significant negative association with private investment shares. But the inclusion of Lexcon is sufficient 
for the coefficient on terms of trade volatility (vtot) to become insignificantly different from zero.
21 Both these variables are expressed in natural logs, which resulted in a better empirical fit. For monvol
we use standard deviation of the residuals of the AR (1) process of M1 to GDP ratio.
22 Our results are also robust to the inclusion of the coefficient of variation of quarterly inflation rates. 
Since it significantly reduces the sample size, we do not report the results here.
23 Data is accessible via the following website: http://www.databanks.sitehosting.net/Default.htm15
the weighted conflict index (lconflict), which combines a larger number of Banks’ 
indicators. More specifically, the conflict index is a weighted measure of the number 
of riots, coups, assassinations, general strikes, government crises, purges, revolutions, 
anti-government demonstrations, and instances of guerrilla warfare. A high value 
indicates an unstable society. 
Neither of these two indicators has a statistically significant coefficient when added to 
our basic specification. Thus, despite previous empirical evidence on this subject, we 
do not find any additional role for these political instability indicators in explaining 
cross-country differences in private investment shares. One possible explanation may 
be the inclusion of ethnic fractionalization, which has been consistently informative in 
our regressions.
24 It is often contended that ethnically diverse societies are more prone 
to conflict or civil strife. Viewed from this perspective, it could be argued that our 
measure of ethnic diversity captures the relevant information for explaining private 
investment shares that is contained in these political instability indicators. 
(c) Financial development and macroeconomic distortions
Several previous studies have highlighted the possible relationship between private 
investment and financial development (e.g. Serven 2002; Ndikumana 2005). Column 
(1) of Table 5 reports that we find a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient 
on a standard measure of financial development (the ratio of private sector credit to 
GDP, denoted as Credit) in our preferred specification for the log of private 
investment shares. Again, the coefficients on export concentration (lexcon) and net oil 
exports (netoil) remain significant in this specification, although the coefficient on 
lexcon is now significant only at the 10% level.
Column (2) controls for the initial level of development by including the natural log 
of real GDP per capita in 1970 from the Penn World Tables (lgdp). The coefficient on 
lgdp is positive and significant at the 10% level, indicating that a higher starting level 
of per capita income is associated with a higher share of private investment in GDP. 
However, the inclusion of lgdp does not affect our basic results for net oil exports and 
export concentration. Column (3) controls for an important macroeconomic distortion, 
the black market premium, or more generally, the percentage difference between the 
black market and official exchange rates (BMP).
25 The literature on economic growth
and investment has often included the black market premium as a general proxy for 
macroeconomic distortions and protectionist policies. As is clear from the results in 
column (3), the coefficient on BMP is negatively signed but insignificantly different 
from zero. The inclusion of BMP again does not change our key results. 
Columns (4)-(6) include three other indicators of macroeconomic policy as additional 
explanatory variables. With these new controls, the sample size is allowed to reduce 
to 62 countries. To control for any crowding out effects of public debt on private 
investment, we include the ratio of debt service payments to total exports (dserv) and 
the ratio of total external debt to GDP (ledt) in columns (4) and (5). In order to control 
for the effects of exchange rate misalignment, we add the natural log of an index of 
24 We also find in our background empirical work that there is little or no additional information 
another measure of ethnicity, the measure of ethnic polarization, which has been previously related to 
investment (Reynal-Querol, 2005).
25 As is standard in the literature, we construct this variable as the log of (1+black market premium). 16
exchange rate overvaluation (loverv) in column (6). Data on the first two indicators 
comes from the World Development Indicators (WDI), whereas the overvaluation 
index has been obtained from Dollar (1992) and the Global Development Network 
(GDN) database. The results reported in columns (4)-(6) do not provide evidence of 
any additional explanatory power of these macroeconomic indicators. Again the 
inclusion of these additional controls does not affect our basic results.
(d) Geography 
Our next empirical test is to consider the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of 
selected geographical characteristics that have been previously related to growth 
(Gallup et al. 1999). There are two important reasons to control for geography. First, 
given that there is a demonstrable link between geography and economic growth, it 
may also have a direct influence on investment shares. Second, there is a positive 
association between resource abundance and measures of tropicality. A large number 
of resource-rich developing countries are concentrated in tropical areas. This raises 
the possibility that any effects of natural resources highlighted in our paper could be 
an artefact of the role of adverse geography. 
In either case, geography could be an omitted dimension in our analysis. Furthermore, 
previous empirical work has not properly investigated the role of geography in 
explaining private investment shares. We test for this possibility by directly 
controlling for commonly available geographic indicators in our preferred 
specification. The results are presented in Table 6. We begin in column (1) by adding 
the log of minimum distance from major markets (lmdist), taken from Radelet and 
Sachs (1998), as a possible indicator for market access. It is based on minimum 
distance from one of the major international ports, Rotterdam, New York, Los 
Angeles or Tokyo. Proximity to international markets can be an important 
determinant of transport costs and opportunities for export diversification. As is clear 
from column (1) in Table 6, the inclusion of lmdist does not weaken any of our main 
results.
We add a wide range of other geographic attributes in columns (2)-(7). These are the 
proportion of the population in Koeppen-Geiger temperate zones (kgptemp), latitude 
or distance from the equator (eqdist), a dummy variable for landlocked countries 
(landlock), the log of the Frankel-Romer predicted trade share (ln_FRtrade), the 
percentage of area in the tropics (tropicar) and the proportion of land within 100 
kilometres of the coast or a navigable river (lnd100cr). The source of these 
geographic indicators is Gallup et al. (1998) and Frankel and Romer (1999). The 
evidence in Table 6 clearly demonstrates that our results are robust to the inclusion of 
these geographic characteristics. After controlling for the main variables in our 
baseline specification, none of these geographic measures has a statistically 
significant effect on private investment shares. 
(e) Instrumental Variables results
The various tests described above indicate a robust partial correlation between the 
export concentration index and private investment shares. But this correlation does 
not imply a causal effect. Our final robustness check considers the possibility that our 
key measure of trade structure, the export concentration index, and the trade openness 17
variable (lopenwb), should be treated as endogenous variables in these models for 
private investment shares. The ability of countries to engage in international trade and 
to diversify their export structures may be jointly determined with current levels of 
investment. In particular, both export concentration and investment can be affected by 
policy. We consider how our results are affected by treating this measure of export 
structure as an endogenous variable in our investment models.
The results in Table 6 indicate that several of the geographical variables that we 
considered as potential explanatory variables for investment shares could safely be 
excluded from these models. These geographical characteristics are therefore 
available as instruments for export concentration and trade openness. Here, we 
consider using the proportion of the population in Koeppen-Geiger temperate zones 
(kgptemp) and the dummy variable for landlocked countries (landlock) as possible 
instruments for the export concentration index (lexcon). Both of these variables are 
correlated with lexcon.
26 As proposed by Frankel and Romer (1999), we use the log of 
Frankel-Romer constructed trade share (ln_FRtrade) as an instrument for the trade to 
GDP ratio (lopenwb).
Table 7 presents the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation of our basic 
specification for the log of private investment shares, in which these two explanatory 
variables are treated as endogenous. This specification uses a sample of 70 countries 
for which data on the geographic instruments is available. OLS estimates of the same 
specification are reported for comparison, and the first-stage regressions explaining 
differences across countries in export concentration and trade shares are also 
reported.
27
These first-stage regressions indicate that our three instrumental variables have 
significant and independent explanatory power for both lexcon and lopenwb, even 
conditional on the remaining explanatory variables that are included in our investment 
model. This is confirmed by the Kleibergen-Paap test, which strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis that the parameters of interest in the investment equation are under-
identified. Conversely the Hansen/Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis that 
the over-identifying restrictions used here are valid. Taken together, these 
specification test results suggest that our instrumental variables are both informative 
and valid.
We find that the 2SLS estimates of the coefficients on lexcon and lopenwb (and the 
other explanatory variables) are similar to the OLS estimates, both in terms of signs, 
magnitudes and statistical significance. These IV results do not suggest that the 
possible endogeneity of our export concentration or openness measures is likely to be 
driving the significant negative coefficient found on lexcon in our main investment 
models.
26 The simple correlation coefficient between kgptemp and lexcon is -0.52. And, the unconditional 
correlation between landlock and lexcon is 0.30.
27 The 2SLS results and associated specification tests were computed using the ivreg2 command in 
Stata.18
IV. Conclusion
This paper examines a relatively neglected aspect of the literature on the natural 
resource curse: the relationship between natural resources and investment. We
provide one of the first systematic empirical investigations of this subject. In doing so, 
we rely on cross-section regression models where the main dependent variable is the 
log of the average share of private investment in GDP. Our results are based on a 
sample of 72 developing countries during the period 1970-98.
Our empirical approach is distinctive in that we emphasize robust specifications
suggested by the BMA and PcGets model selection procedures, and we consider a 
wider range of candidate predictors of investment than previous studies. Our results 
highlight a more nuanced role of natural resources, whereby oil and non-oil resources 
appear to have different effects on investment levels. Specifically, we find a robust 
positive influence from the share of net oil exports in GDP, and a robust negative 
influence from a measure of export concentration. 
Countries with high oil revenues tend to have high shares of private investment in 
GDP. This could partly reflect the capital-intensive nature of oil production and 
related service industries. Oil wealth could also play a role in relaxing financing 
constraints on investment in other local economic activities. We also find that oil 
wealth is associated with high shares of public investment in GDP.
The negative relationship between export concentration and private investment shares 
may reflect more broadly the adverse consequences of a trade structure that is tilted 
heavily towards primary commodity dependence. To the extent that natural resources 
have an effect on export structure, they clearly matter for investment. But our results 
ascribe a more important role to export concentration as an explanation for low 
investment, rather than natural resources per se. These findings are consistent with 
those of Lederman and Maloney (2007), who find a similarly important role of trade 
structure in the context of economic growth, and van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2007), 
who regard natural resource abundance as a hindrance to export diversification. These 
results also support the hypothesis that the resource curse will tend to be weaker in 
countries with more diversified trade structures (Hausmann and Rigobon 2003). 
We consider the impact of a variety of different natural resource indicators on our 
findings. However we find that our two export structure variables, net oil exports and 
export concentration, tend to dominate other measures of resource abundance or 
resource dependence in the explanation of cross-country differences in private 
investment as a share of GDP. Our results also highlight the role of ethnic diversity, 
trade openness and the relative price of capital in accounting for differences across 
countries in private investment shares.
The striking aspect of these results is the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of 
a wide variety of alternative controls. In particular, we do not find any significant 
additional information in measures of political instability, macroeconomic volatility, 
financial development, macroeconomic policy and geography. While it would be 
hazardous to infer any causal relationship from these cross-section regressions, we 
can be confident that the significant coefficients we find on our key variables are not 
driven by the omission of a large number of candidate explanatory variables. We also19
find no indication that the significant negative coefficient on our measure of export 
concentration is explained by the potential endogeneity of this variable in our 
investment models. 
In describing these results, one important clarification is in order. While this paper 
presents new empirical evidence on the relationship between natural resources and 
private investment as a share of GDP, it does not address another question that is 
equally, if not more, important: how does resource abundance affect the efficiency, as 
opposed to the level, of investment? There is a growing body of case-study evidence 
that notes a “collapse in the efficiency of investment” in resource-rich societies—see, 
for example, Lal and Myint (1996) and Collier and Gunning (1999). This requires a 
separate and perhaps more detailed investigation, something we intend to return to in 
future work.
We should also be cautious in drawing simple conclusions for policy from this largely 
descriptive empirical analysis. Still the results hint at the potential importance of trade 
openness and export diversification if the objective is to raise private sector 
investment levels on a sustainable basis. These considerations may be particularly 
important in the context of resource-rich developing countries. This raises enormous 
questions about how such improvements could be achieved, but our findings at least 
highlight the potential importance of research on these issues. Complementary 
research on the relationship between natural resources and the allocative efficiency 
and productivity of investment should also be a priority.20
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T Table 2: Resource abundance and investment: a first look at the data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coeff lprinv lprinv lprinv lpbinv lgdi
pi_p -0.210*** -0.163*** -0.157** 0.0222 -0.0900**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.059) (0.075) (0.038)
checks 0.0668* 0.0459 0.0455 -0.118** -0.00998
(0.039) (0.033) (0.032) (0.057) (0.027)
lopenwb 0.237*** 0.271*** 0.263*** 0.244*** 0.224***
(0.062) (0.053) (0.058) (0.091) (0.047)
ethnic -0.484*** -0.464*** -0.421*** -0.0275 -0.298***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.20) (0.10)
reg_eap 0.246*** 0.171*** 0.193 0.157 0.191***
(0.076) (0.060) (0.15) (0.19) (0.070)
lexcon -0.201*** -0.190*** -0.0212 -0.0837
(0.057) (0.062) (0.13) (0.060)
netoil 2.461*** 2.332*** 1.064** 1.632***









Constant 1.843*** 1.595*** 1.600*** 1.234*** 2.341***
(0.35) (0.28) (0.34) (0.46) (0.24)
Observs 72 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.53 0.68 0.68 0.21 0.58
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































T Table 5: Robustness to financial development and macroeconomic indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pi_p -0.157*** -0.150** -0.169*** -0.159*** -0.166*** -0.161***
(0.057) (0.059) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.059)
checks 0.0484 0.0188 0.0417 0.0332 0.0324 0.0414
(0.042) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.038)
ethnic -0.467*** -0.406** -0.513*** -0.531*** -0.508*** -0.502***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
lopenwb 0.200*** 0.229*** 0.243*** 0.287*** 0.268*** 0.275***
(0.064) (0.056) (0.069) (0.064) (0.069) (0.066)
reg_eap 0.160* 0.284*** 0.187** 0.219*** 0.217*** 0.177**
(0.080) (0.078) (0.073) (0.069) (0.071) (0.080)
lexcon -0.142* -0.175** -0.188** -0.205** -0.214*** -0.221***
(0.075) (0.067) (0.071) (0.078) (0.075) (0.070)
netoil 2.350*** 2.028*** 2.539*** 2.521*** 2.516*** 2.590***













Constant 1.824*** 1.043* 1.790*** 1.492*** 1.682*** 1.782***
(0.29) (0.52) (0.39) (0.34) (0.32) (0.53)
Observs 65 65 65 63 63 62
R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.67
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































T Table 7: IV Results 
Dependent 
variable:
































































































The 2SLS results treat the log of the export concentration index (lexcon) and log of the trade share in 
GDP (lopenwb) as endogenous explanatory variables, and use log of the Frankel-Romer natural 
openness measure (ln_FRtrade), proportion of the population in Koeppen-Geigger temperate zones 
(kgptemp) and dummy variable for landlocked countries (landlock) as additional instrumental 
variables.
Numbers reported in parentheses are t-statistics. P-values are reported for the Hansen/Sargan J test of
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Description of Appendix 1
Appendix 1 replicates the basic specification used by Gylfason and Zoega (2006), 
henceforth GZ, using our sample and variables. Column (1) tries to follow as closely 
as possible the main specification in GZ. The dependent variable is the log of the 
average share of gross domestic investment in GDP. The two resource indicators 
included are the log of natural capital as a share of total wealth (lncs) and the log of 
natural capital per capita (lncap). Two other controls are included: the log of initial 
real GDP per capita (lgdp) and the Kaufmann et al. (1999) aggregate governance 
indicator (kkz_av).28 The sample consists of 69 countries.
The results in column (1) are in broad conformity with the findings reported in GZ
(2006). The natural wealth share (lncs) has a significant negative coefficient and the 
natural capital share (lncap) has a significant positive coefficient. These coefficients 
are similar in absolute value, suggesting that these investment shares are explained 
by the log of total wealth per capita, rather than the natural capital terms in the 
numerator of these ratios.29 Like GZ, we do not obtain a significant effect of the 
institutional indicator (kkz, in our case). Next, in column (2), we add all the main
explanatory variables that we have emphasized in our paper, except the natural 
resource/trade structure indicators. These are the relative price of capital, ethnic 
fractionalization, trade openness and the East Asia and Pacific dummy variable. As is 
clear from column (2), these variables are all significant in explaining total 
investment shares. With the inclusion of these variables, the natural wealth share 
(lncs) loses statistical significance. 
Our two preferred natural resource indicators, lexcon and netoil, are added in 
column (3). As expected, the coefficient on netoil is positive and statistically 
significant. The coefficient on lexcon is negative although not significant at 
conventional levels. However, with the addition of these resource indicators, both 
lncs and lncap become unimportant. 
Columns (4)-(6) repeat this exercise for models of the log of private investment as a 
share of GDP. The results follow a similar pattern. The inclusion of netoil and lexcon,
together with our main control variables, again leaves the coefficients on lncs and 
lncap individually and jointly insignificant. The net oil exports variable has a strong
positive effect on private investment in all specifications. Export concentration is 
found to have a significant negative effect if we drop the insignificant lncap measure 
in column (7) or the insignificant lncs variable in column (8).
28 Gylfason and Zoega include the civil liberties index. We include a closely correlated and a stronger 
indicator, the aggregate governance index. The aggregate governance index also has a better sample 
coverage.
29 The model has the form y = 1(lnNC-lnPOP) - 2(lnNC-lnTW) + X + , where y denotes the 
dependent variable, NC denotes natural capital, TW denotes total wealth, POP denotes population and 
the vector X contains the remaining explanatory variables. Imposing the restriction that 1 = 2 = ,
this simplifies to y = (lnTW -lnPOP) + X + .36
Appendix 2: Description of main variables
Variable Description Source
BMP Log of 1 plus black market premium GDN database
checks Checks and balances (checks2a), Database of 
Political Institutions
Beck et al. (2001)
Credit Credit to the private sector by banks and other 
financial institutions (series: pcrof), share of GDP
Financial structure database, Beck 
et al. (2000)
dserv Total debt service as a ratio of exports of goods, 
services and income
World Development Indicators
eqdist Latitude – distance from equator http://www.cid.harvard.edu
ethnic Ethnic fractionalization index Alesina et al. (2003)
export
categories
Dummy for fuel, non-fuel primary, and 
manufactured good exporting countries
World Bank – GDN Database
grvol Standard deviation the of growth of real GDP per 
capita
Penn World Tables, release 6.2
kgptemp Proportion of people in the Koeppen-Geigger 
temperate zone
CID, Harvard University.   
Gallup et al. (1999).
kkz_av Average of six measures of institutional 
development institutional: voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, light regulatory burden, 
rule of law, and freedom from graft
Kaufmann et al. (1999)
landlock Dummy for landlocked country, excluding 
countries in Western and Central Europe
Gallup et al. (1999).
lconflict Log of the conflict index, which is a weighted 
measure of the number of riots, coups, 
assassinations, general strikes, government crises, 
purges, revolutions, anti-government
demonstrations, and instances of guerrilla warfare.
Arthur Banks Cross-National 
Time Series Database
ledt Total external debt as a % of GNI, in natural log World Development Indicators
lexcon
Natural log of the export concentration index – a 
modified version of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann 
index.
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics
lgdp Log of the real GDP per capita in 1970 Penn World Tables, release 6.2
lmdist Log of minimum distance from three main markets: 
Belgium, Japan or New York.
Radelet and Sachs (1998)
ln_FRtrade Natural log of the Frankel-Romer measure of 
natural openness. 
Frankel and Romer (1998)
lncap Log of natural wealth per capita World Bank (2006)
lncs Log of the share of natural wealth in total wealth World Bank (2006)
lnd100cr The proportion of a country’s total area within 
100km of the ocean or ocean navigable river
Gallup et al. (1999).
lopenwb Log of the share of exports plus imports to GDP World Development Indicators
loverv Log of the overvaluation index Dollar (1992); GDN database
lpbinv log of the ratio of public investment to GDP GDN database




monvol S. D. of the residuals of the AR(1) process of the 
M1 to GDP series
World Development Indicators
netoil Share of the net oil exports in GDP Herb (2005)
pci Political Constraints Index is a structurally derived 
measure of the feasibility of policy change (the 
extent to which a change in the preferences of any 
one actor may lead to a change in government 
policy).
Henisz (2001), 2002 release.37
pi_p The ratio of price of investment to the price of 
GDP
Penn World Tables, release 6.2
rent Ratio of revenues from petroleum and minerals to 
total government revenues
Herb (2005)
rescoff Dummy variable for countries with coffee and 
cocoa resources
Isham et al. (2005)
respoint Dummy variable for countries with point-source 
resources: fuels, minerals and plantation crops
Isham et al. (2005)
snr The share of mineral production in GDP for 1971 Center for International
Development at Harvard 
University (CID), 2002.
SPI Index of socio-political instability; principal 
components of 
Arthur Banks Cross-National 
Time Series Database
sxp Share of primary commodity exports in GDP Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
tropicar Percentage area in the tropics Gallup et al. (1999)
vgcons S.D. of the ratio of government consumption to 
GDP
World Development Indicators
vtot S.D. of the first log-differences of the terms of 
trade index for goods and services
GDF & World Development 
Indicators
xconst Average Constraints on the executive POLITY IV dataset by Robert 
Gurr
Dummy variables included for:
reg_eap East Asia and Pacific
reg_mena Middle East and North Africa
reg_sa South Asia
reg_lac Latin America and Caribbean
reg_ssa Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: GDN database38
Appendix 3: List of 72 countries included in the sample
code country
  DZA Algeria 
  ARG              Argentina 
  BGD Bangladesh
  BEN               Benin 
  BOL               Bolivia 
  BRA               Brazil 
 CMR              Cameroon 
  CAF               Central African Republic 
  CHL               Chile 
  CHN              China 
  COL               Colombia 
  COM              Comoros 
  CRI                Costa Rica 
  CIV                Cote d'Ivoire 
  CYP               Cyprus 
  DOM             Dominican Republic 
  ECU               Ecuador 
  EGY               Egypt, Arab Rep. 
  SLV                El Salvador 
  ETH               Ethiopia 
  GAB               Gabon 
  GMB              Gambia, The 
 GHA              Ghana 
  GTM              Guatemala 
  GIN               Guinea 
  GNB              Guinea-Bissau 
  GUY              Guyana
  HTI               Haiti 
  HND             Honduras 
  IND               India 
  IDN               Indonesia 
  IRN               Iran, Islamic Rep. 
  JAM               Jamaica 
  JOR               Jordan 
  KEN              Kenya 
  KOR              Korea, Rep.
  code country
  LBR              Liberia 
  MDG            Madagascar 
  MWI             Malawi 
  MYS             Malaysia  
  MLI              Mali 
  MRT             Mauritania 
  MUS             Mauritius 
  MEX             Mexico 
  MAR             Morocco 
  NPL              Nepal 
  NIC              Nicaragua 
  NER              Niger 
  PAK              Pakistan 
  PAN              Panama
  PNG              Papua New Guinea 
  PRY               Paraguay 
  PER               Peru 
  PHL               Philippines 
  PRT               Portugal 
  RWA              Rwanda 
  SEN               Senegal
  SLE               Sierra Leone 
  ZAF               South Africa 
  LKA               Sri Lanka 
  SDN              Sudan 
  TZA              Tanzania 
  THA              Thailand 
  TGO              Togo 
  TTO              Trinidad and Tobago 
  TUN              Tunisia 
  TUR               Turkey 
  UGA              Uganda 
  URY               Uruguay 
  VEN               Venezuela, RB 
  ZMB               Zambia 
  ZWE               Zimbabwe 